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Abstract: We present a dynamic model of capacity utilization and growth which takes into due account 
the joint determination of the international competitiveness (measured by the real exchange rate) and 
functional income distribution. It follows that how distribution, capacity utilization and growth vary with 
the real exchange rate depends on the cause of change in the latter (nominal exchange rate or markup). 
Over the medium run, the nominal exchange rate (markup) changes when the actual real exchange rate 
differs from the level preferred by the government (capitalists). While there is a medium-run equilibrium 
in which capitalists and the government come to share a preferred real exchange rate, the economy may 
not converge to it. In fact, when the government is primarily concerned with preserving workers‘ share in 
income when manipulating the nominal exchange rate, a limit cycle obtains: the economy experiences 
endogenous cyclical fluctuations in the real exchange rate, distribution, capacity utilization and growth 
that resemble the experience of several developing countries. Thus, growth regressions featuring the real 
exchange rate should include distribution in the vector of control variables, which has not been the case. 
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1. Introduction 
 The growth-enhancing properties of a competitive, undervalued real exchange rate have been 
recently emphasized by a burgeoning theoretical and empirical literature (see, for instance, Rodrik 2008 
and Razmi et al. 2009). Nonetheless, functional income distribution and the real exchange rate are 
functionally related: whether the real exchange rate and the wage share, for instance, move in the same or 
opposite direction depends on the ultimate source of the change in any of them (Blecker 1989, 1999). In 
fact, whether or not the domestic pricing equation includes imported intermediates also matters for the 
relationship between functional distribution and the real exchange rate, as the presence of intermediates 
represents another direct claimant on domestic income. Therefore, whether exchange devaluations 
actually make for a rise in capacity utilization and economic growth also depends on the impact on 
aggregate effective demand of the accompanying change in distribution. Indeed, the possibility that 
devaluation is contractionary for output due to distributional reasons dates back (at least) to Díaz-
Alejandro (1963) and Krugman and Taylor (1978). 
 Admittedly, the recent theoretical literature has been dealing with the issue of the sustainability of 
a competitive real exchange rate (given some of its self-undermining ‗externalities‘, such as an upward 
pressure on non-tradable prices and/or nominal wage) and/or the related issue of avoiding ‗negative 
effective demand externalities‘ coming through an accompanying change in distribution. For instance, 
Razmi, Rapetti and Skott (2009) assume unemployment in a two-sector model to show that changes in 
the real exchange rate affect the quantity and composition of employment in a way that allow the real 
exchange rate to be used to facilitate sustained capital accumulation. Porcile and Lima (2010) show how 
the elasticity of labor supply and endogenous (Verdoorn-Kaldor) technological change play a role 
(individually and connectedly) in preventing the real exchange rate from appreciating as the economy 
grows. Razmi (2010) shows how production diversification and learning-by-accumulation can avoid 
negative distributional implications of nominal exchange devaluations. Meanwhile, Rapetti (2011) shows 
that exchange depreciations will more likely trigger an acceleration of growth if they are simultaneously 
implemented with domestic demand management policies that prevent non-tradables price inflation and 
wage management policies that coordinate wage increases with tradable productivity growth. 
 However, the recent literature on the subject has been ignoring interclass and intraclass conflicts 
over the preferred real exchange rate, with the latter being invariably (even if implicitly) conceived of as 
a consensual level, while the (often heated) public debates on exchange rate policy clearly illustrate that 
those conflicts are pervasive. As a result, it is reasonable to treat capitalists and the government as having 
preferred real exchange rates which may differ from each other, and an innovation of this paper lies in the 
incorporation of such a potential conflict of interests. In fact, even though we do not explicitly consider 
sectoral differences in terms of tradables and non-tradables in this paper, a more inclusive model could 
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assume that capitalists themselves hold heterogeneous preferences as regards the preferred real exchange 
rate (for instance, with capitalists who are less (or even not) exposed to international competition as either 
exporters or importers arguably caring less about the real exchange rate). To keep focus on interclass 
conflicts over the real exchange rate, however, we treat capitalists as holding homogenous preferences in 
that regard. 
 Actually, the literature on the subject has been ignoring not only that capitalists, workers and the 
government (usually reacting to pressures from those classes) have different preferences with respect to 
the desired real exchange rate, but also that those players have quite different instruments to influence the 
course of the actual real exchange rate. It is often ignored that none of the players have direct control over 
all the variables on which the real exchange rate ultimately depends. Capitalists, for instance, taking the 
nominal wage, the nominal exchange rate and (eventually) the technological parameters as given, have a 
preferred real exchange rate to which a desired markup (their controllable variable) corresponds. 
Meanwhile, workers, taking the markup, the nominal exchange rate and (eventually) the technological 
parameters as given, have a preferred real exchange rate to which a desired nominal wage rate (their 
controllable variable) corresponds. Finally, the monetary authority, taking the markup, the nominal wage 
and (eventually) the technological parameters as given, have a preferred real exchange rate to which a 
desired nominal exchange rate (its controllable variable) corresponds. Admittedly, capitalists‘ desired 
markup, workers‘ desired nominal wage rate and the government‘s desired nominal exchange (all of them 
reflecting a preferred real exchange rate by the corresponding player) need not be (all) exogenously 
given. 
In a world in which the degree of openness has tended to increase steadily in the past twenty years 
and in which foreign competition is fierce, it is reasonable to assume that firms are well aware of the 
implications of the real exchange rate for market shares.
1
 As noted by Blecker (1989, 1999), international 
competition constraints the degree of monopoly and this has an impact on markups. Moreover, the real 
exchange rate (international competitiveness) preferred by capitalists is likely to be influenced by their 
consumption and capital accumulation plans. The higher the desired accumulation, the higher the real 
exchange rate aimed at by the firms. 
Meanwhile, the real exchange rate preferred by the government will have to balance two 
conflicting objectives: (i) in a context in which it is necessary to stabilize prices, there will be a tendency 
                                                 
1
 There is no need to emphasize that trade interdependence has expanded in an impressive way in the last decades. The new 
role that China, India and other Asian economies play in global trade contributed decisively to this outcome. Latin America 
made as well substantial progress in this direction. The region rapidly moved from high tariff and nontariff barriers, with its 
ensuing low openness coefficient, towards unilateral trade liberalization and a higher share of exports and imports in total 
GDP. This process of course led domestic firms to adjust. In almost closed economies, they were able to set markups looking 
principally at the desired share in total income. On the other hand, in increasingly open economies, the key variable for 
sustaining growth is the real exchange rate, and therefore it could not be ignored in the decision process over prices.  
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to aim at a lower exchange rate, stimulating imports and curbing inflation; and (ii) conversely, when the 
economy faces a severe disequilibrium in the external front, related to mounting trade deficits and/or an 
increasing cost of financing the external debt, the government will prefer a higher real exchange rate, in 
spite of both its likely inflationary impacts and the worsening of income distribution. Many developing 
economies went through cycles in which overvaluation during stabilization programs was followed by the 
quest for competitiveness when external crisis set in.
2
 In general, in normal times, it is likely that the 
government target would be some average of the real exchange rate preferred by workers and capitalists, 
and a more inclusive model could make the corresponding weights endogenous as well. Two extreme 
cases would be the monetary authority sharing the same preferred real exchange rate with either 
capitalists or workers. The set of possible scenarios arising from these different assumptions is extremely 
rich and we clearly cannot discuss all of them in this paper. To the extent that the real exchange rate 
affects so many dimensions of the economy (external equilibrium, inflation and growth), and it is 
frequently a focal point in the distributive conflict, it is necessary to analyze the objectives and 
instruments that each actor can deploy in the bargaining process. 
As a result, given that (i) whether the wage share and the real exchange rate move in the same or 
opposite direction depends on the ultimate source of the change in any of them and that (ii) capitalists, 
workers and the government not only have heterogeneous preferences with respect to the real exchange 
rate, but also different instruments under their control to influence the course of the actual real exchange 
rate, our relevant state variables in the dynamic analysis will be the markup and the nominal exchange 
rate rather than the wage share and the real exchange rate itself. This will require, however, the use of 
some simplifying assumptions. 
Motivated by these considerations, this paper develops a dynamic model of capacity utilization 
and growth in which the joint determination of income distribution and international competitiveness 
(measure by the real exchange rate) is taken into account in the determination of aggregate effective 
demand. In a given short run, how a change in the real exchange rate will affect capacity utilization and 
growth depends on whether it has come about through a change in either the nominal exchange rate or the 
markup (or both). The reason is that a change in the real exchange rate (wage share) brought about by a 
change in either the nominal exchange rate or the markup will not leave the wage share (real exchange 
rate) unchanged. Meanwhile, a change in the profit share (real exchange rate) brought about by a change 
in the markup will not leave the real exchange rate (profit share) unchanged. Indeed, a major motivation 
                                                 
2
 For instance, overvaluation during stabilization programmes occurred in Argentina and Chile in the 1970s, and in Brazil and 
Argentina in the 1990s. Fixed nominal exchange rates, controlled devaluations at a rate below the actual levels of domestic 
inflation, and high interest rates to achieve inflation targets, have been used in these countries as nominal anchors, leading in 
all cases to real exchange undervaluation (Ffrench-Davis and Ocampo, 2001). On the other hand, most developing economies 
and some Eastern European countries in the 1980s were obliged to keep the real exchange rate at a very high level (with 
disastrous implications, in most cases, for inflation and income distribution) in order to be able to service the external debt.  
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underlying our formal specification in terms of the markup and the nominal exchange rate (and not the 
distributive shares and the real exchange rate themselves) as state variables is precisely the need to take 
into explicit consideration such a joint determination of income distribution and international price 
competitiveness. 
Over the medium run, the nominal exchange rate (markup) will vary in response to discrepancies 
between the actual real exchange rate and the real exchange rate preferred by the government 
(capitalists). However, as a change in the actual exchange rate may come about through a change in either 
the nominal exchange rate or the markup (or both), different specifications of the adjustment dynamics of 
the nominal exchange rate and the markup will have distinct implications in terms of existence and 
stability of a medium-run equilibrium solution for the real exchange rate, and thereby for the dynamics of 
capacity utilization and economic growth over the medium run. 
Suppose the economy is in a given short run in which the monetary authority and capitalists have 
different (though endogenous) preferences with respect to the real exchange rate. The issues worth 
addressing then become (i) whether there is a medium-run equilibrium in which capitalists and the 
monetary authority come to have a common preferred real exchange rate, (ii) whether the economy will 
actually converge to any existing equilibrium solution in which preferences over the real exchange rate 
have become homogeneous, and (iii) what are the corresponding implications in terms of the dynamics of 
capacity utilization and growth. As derived in Section 4, while for the existence issue (i) the resulting 
finding was that there is indeed a medium-run (Nash) equilibrium characterized by capitalists and the 
monetary authority coming to share a preferred real exchange rate, the resulting findings for issues (ii) 
and (iii) depend crucially on the specifics of the adjustment dynamics of the nominal exchange rate and 
the markup. In fact, while in one specification of such adjustment dynamics the economy necessarily 
converges to the medium-run equilibrium characterized by capitalists and the monetary authority sharing 
a preferred real exchange rate, in another specification such a convergence obtains only by a fluke. In yet 
another specification of the adjustment dynamics, in which the government is mainly concerned with 
distribution in favor of workers when managing the nominal exchange rate, a limit cycle obtains. In this 
latter specification, therefore, the model produces conservative fluctuations in the markup and the 
nominal exchange rate, and hence in distributive shares and the real exchange rate; as a result, the 
economy experiences endogenous cyclical fluctuations of its international competitiveness, capacity 
utilization and economic growth that closely resemble the experience of several developing countries in 
different historical periods. As it turns out, a major empirical implication of the model developed in this 
paper is that all growth regressions featuring the real exchange rate (or an index of real exchange 
undervaluation) should include functional distribution (or proxies such as real unit labor costs) in the 
vector of control variables. Or, some procedure should be used to try to decompose a change in the real 
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exchange rate (or in an index of real exchange undervaluation) into changes in the major components of 
the real exchange rate, namely, nominal exchange rate (or an index of nominal undervaluation), nominal 
unit labor (and, possibly, intermediate) costs and profit margins. 
 The remainder of the paper is organized in the following manner. Section 2 describes the building 
blocks of the model, and Section 3 analyzes its behavior in the short run. While Section 4 discusses the 
behavior of the model in the medium run, the closing section provides a summary of the main findings 
derived along the way. 
 
2. The structure of the model 
 The domestic economy is open to international trade but its government sector is omitted for 
simplicity (except for the existence of a monetary authority in charge of managing the nominal exchange 
rate). Domestic production consists of a single good which can be used for both investment and 
consumption purposes. The resulting output is produced through a (fixed-coefficient) technological 
combination of two domestic (and homogeneous) factors of production, labor and capital, and an 
imported (composite) intermediate input. This fixed-coefficient assumption can be justified by reference 
to an independence of the choice of techniques of factor prices or to technological rigidities in factor 
substitution, it being amply supported by a reputable literature.
3
 
Capitalist firms in oligopolistic markets carry out domestic production. They produce (and hire 
domestic labor) according to effective demand, it being considered only the case in which excess capital 
capacity prevails in the short and medium runs.
4
 As a result, domestic labor employment is determined by 
domestic production: 
L aX       (1) 
where L  is the domestic employment level, X  is the domestic real output (hereafter, simply ‗output‘ or 
‗income‘) level, and a  stands for the corresponding labor-output ratio. The latter, along with the other 
technical coefficients (domestic capital and imported intermediate input), is given at a point in time, 
having all resulted from previous technological dynamics. Over time (at least over the medium run), 
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 Verspagen (1990), for instance, shows that localized technological change strongly diminishes the short-run possibilities for 
factor substitution. Probably the most quoted formalization of localized technological change is still the one by Stiglitz and 
Atkinson (1969). The underlying idea is that for any industrial grouping the range of efficient techniques is often very small, 
sometimes reaching the limit of one technological system which rules at any point in time. Localized technical change strongly 
diminishes the short-run possibilities for substitution, and constant improvements of one single production technique usually 
lead to a Leontief shape similar to the one assumed here. 
4
 Steindl (1952) argues that oligopolistic firms plan excess capital capacity so as to be ready for a sudden expansion of sales. 
One reason is that it is not possible to expand capacity step by step as the market grows due to the indivisibility and durability 
of the plant and equipment. There is also the issue of entry deterrence: if prices are sufficiently high, entry becomes feasible 
even where capital requirements are great; therefore, the holding of excess capacity allows olipolistic firms to confront new 
entrants by suddenly raising supply and driving prices down. 
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however, while the other technical coefficients are assumed to remain constant, the domestic labor-output 
ratio is assumed to fall at a rate h  due to purely labor-augmenting (Harrod-neutral) technological change. 
The domestic price level (hereafter, simply ‗price level‘) is given at a point in time, it being 
determined as a markup over average prime costs in the following way: 
( )mP z aW beP       (2) 
where 1z   is the domestic markup factor (one plus the domestic markup, and hereafter simply 
‗markup‘), W  is the domestic nominal wage, b  is the imported intermediate input coefficient, e  is the 
nominal exchange rate (home currency price of foreign exchange) and mP  is the exogenously given 
foreign currency price of the imported (composite) intermediate input, which (for simplicity) is assumed 
to be equal to the international price level, *P . Given the focus of this paper, b  and *P  are assumed to 
remain constant over the medium run, so we simplify matters by normalizing both b  and *P  to unity. For 
the same reason, we further assume that the domestic unit nominal labor cost, aW , remains constant over 
the medium run, as the nominal wage is contractually defined to grow at the same rate as labor 
productivity. As we normalize the constant value of aW  to unity, the price level defined by (1) simplifies 
to: 
(1 )P z e        (3) 
The domestic economy is therefore inhabited by two classes, capitalists and workers. Following 
the tradition of Kalecki (1971), Kaldor (1956), Robinson (1956, 1962) and Pasinetti (1962), we assume 
that these classes have different consumption (and hence saving) behavior. Workers provide labor and 
earn only wage income, which is all spent in consumption. Workers are always in excess supply, with the 
number of potential workers (labor supply) growing at a rate denoted by n . Capitalists receive profit 
income, which is the entire surplus over wages and imported inputs, and save all of it. In addition to 
capitalists and workers, therefore, there is also an external claimant on income represented by the 
imported intermediates. From (1) and (3), the share of labor in income,  , is given by: 
1 1
(1 )
Va P
z e
   

    (4) 
where ( / )V W P  stands for the domestic real wage (hereafter, simply ‗real wage‘). As 1z   and 0e  , 
it follows the wage share as defined by (4) is automatically constrained to its economically relevant 
domain given by 0 1  . However, it also follows that both the real wage and the wage share in 
income vary negatively with the markup and the nominal exchange rate. Meanwhile, as the profit income 
is the entire surplus over wages and imported inputs, the profit share in income,  , can be expressed as: 
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*
1 1
WL beP
q
PX P
           (5) 
where 1q eP  is the real exchange rate, as explored below (as b  and *P  were normalized to unity, the 
share of imported intermediates in income is equal to the real exchange rate). As 1z   and 0e  , the real 
exchange rate is automatically constrained to the economically relevant domain of the share of imported 
intermediates in income given by 0 1q  . Meanwhile, as a rise in the markup lowers both the wage 
share and the real exchange rate, it unambiguously results in a rise in the profit share. A rise in the 
nominal exchange rate, however, will both lower the wage share and raise the real exchange rate. As it 
can be checked that ( / ) ( / ) 0e q e      , though, a change in the nominal exchange rate leaves the 
profit share unchanged. In fact, we can use (3) and (4) to re-write (5) as follows: 
11 z         (6) 
which confirms that the profit share varies positively with the markup but is not affected by a change in 
the nominal exchange rate. Besides, as 1z  , the profit share is automatically constrained to its 
economically relevant domain given by 0 1  . Interestingly, given the purpose of this paper, the 
preceding analysis reveals that it is not possible for both the wage and the profit shares to rise 
simultaneously (which would require, per (5), a fall in the share of imported intermediates in income). 
Indeed, while a change in the markup or the nominal exchange rate will vary the wage share in the 
opposite direction, the same change will either vary the profit share in the same direction or leave it 
unaffected, respectively. 
As regards the profit rate as an alternative measure of capitalists‘ profitability, the impact of a 
change in either the markup or the nominal exchange is ambiguous. To see this, note that the profit rate is 
given by: 
1(1 ) (1 )r q u z u           (7) 
where r  is the domestic profit rate (hereafter, simply ‗profit rate‘), which is the flow of money profits 
divided by the value of the domestic capital stock, K , at output price, while u  is domestic (capital) 
capacity utilization (hereafter, simply ‗capacity utilization‘). As a result, though a higher markup raises 
the profit share, the likely accompanying change in capacity utilization may make for a net decrease in 
the profit rate. 
 Meanwhile, the real exchange rate also depends ultimately on the markup and the nominal 
exchange, it being therefore given in the short run. As we define the real exchange rate as the relative 
price of foreign goods, a higher q  means a real depreciation of the domestic currency or improved price 
   
8 
competitiveness of domestic goods.
5
 Formally, the real exchange rate can be re-written in terms of its 
ultimate determinants as: 
(1 )
e
q
z e


      (8) 
As a result, the real exchange rate varies positively (negatively) with the nominal exchange rate 
(markup), / 0q e    ( / 0q z   ), which means that the pass-through of a nominal exchange rate change 
into the price level is incomplete. As seen above, however, both the real wage and the wage share in 
income vary negatively with the markup and the nominal exchange rate. The wage share and the real 
exchange rate are therefore functionally related in the following way: 
( , )
( , )
q z e
z e
e
       (9) 
Hence whether the wage share and the real exchange rate will move in the same direction depends on 
what ultimate determinant of them will change. While a rise (fall) in the markup will lower (raise) both 
the wage share and the real exchange rate, a nominal exchange depreciation (rise in the nominal exchange 
rate) will lower the wage share and raise the real exchange rate. As it turns out, how a change in the real 
exchange rate will affect capacity utilization and growth in the short and medium runs will depend on the 
accompanying change in the wage share. The reason is that the resulting change in aggregate effective 
demand will depend on how both the wage share and the share of imported intermediates in income (and 
thereby the profit share, per (5)) will be affected by a change in any of their common ultimate 
determinants, namely, the markup and the nominal exchange rate. 
 Let‘s then move on to the specification of the behavior of the components of the aggregate 
effective demand, and we simplify matters by mostly using implicit functions all along. Given our 
assumption that workers‘ income is all spent in consumption, while capitalists save all of their profit 
income, the ratio of aggregate consumption to the capital stock, cg , using (4), can be written as: 
(1 )
c ug u
z e
 

     (10) 
Therefore, given capacity utilization, a higher markup or nominal exchange rate, by lowering workers‘ 
share in income, will lead to a fall in aggregate consumption as a proportion of the capital stock. 
Meanwhile, firms make capital accumulation plans described by the following implicit investment 
function: 
                                                 
5
 Clearly, this specification implicitly assumes that domestic and foreign goods are imperfect substitutes, as well as that 
exported goods are qualitatively the same as domestic goods. 
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( , , , )i ig g u q       (11) 
where ig  is desired investment as a proportion of the capital stock,   is a parameter describing 
autonomous investment governed by (say) Keynes‘ animal spirits and , , 0i i iug g g   . We follow Marglin 
and Bhaduri (1990) in making investment to depend positively on the profit share. A broader rationale for 
this specification is that, given capacity utilization, the current profit share is an index of expected future 
earnings and both provides internal funding for investment and makes it easier to raise external funding. 
Meanwhile, we follow Rowthorn (1981) and Dutt (1984, 1990), who in turn follow Steindl (1952), in 
assuming that capital accumulation plans depend positively on capacity utilization due to accelerator-type 
effects.
6
 As it turns out, so far our investment function follows the specification considered to be the 
preferred one in the literature following Marglin and Bhaduri (1990). 
 Meanwhile, there are reasonable theoretical and empirical grounds for including the real exchange 
rate as a separate argument in the investment function above, even if the sign of the corresponding partial 
derivative, iqg , cannot be unambiguously ascertained. For instance, on theoretical grounds, a change in 
the exchange rate has an impact on the price competitiveness of firms (both at home, given the 
competition of imported substitutes, and abroad, due to the change in export prices) and on the cost of 
imported inputs. Yet most available theoretical models provide no clear indication as to which effect is 
dominant, and the overall effect of exchange rates on investment remains an empirical question. And, as 
reported in what follows, the empirical evidence seems to be more favorable to the assumption that 
investment varies positively with the real exchange rate, so we assume 0iqg  . 
 Campa and Goldberg (1999) compare the investment sensitivity to exchange rate in the United 
States, United Kingdom, Japan, and Canada for the period 1970-93, and find investment in Canada to be 
the least responsive to exchange rate movements. Nucci and Pozzolo (2001) investigate the relationship 
between exchange rate fluctuations and the investment decisions of a sample of Italian manufacturing 
firms. The results support the view that an exchange rate depreciation rate has a positive effect on 
investment through the price competitiveness channel, but a negative effect through the cost of imported 
inputs channel. Expectedly, the magnitude of these effects varies over time with changes in the firm's 
external orientation, as measured by the share of foreign sales over total sales, and the dependence on 
imported inputs. The impact of exchange rate changes on investment is stronger for firms with lower 
degree of monopoly power (proxied by lower price-cost margins), facing a high degree of import 
penetration in the domestic market, and of a small size. Besides, they find evidence that the degree of 
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 As recalled in footnote 5, Steindl (1952) argues that firms aim at the preservation of a certain margin of excess capacity. In 
the event, therefore, that actual excess capacity falls below the desired one, firms will tend to speed up the pace of capital 
accumulation. 
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substitutability between domestically produced and imported inputs influences the impact through the 
expenditure side. 
 Meanwhile, Blecker (2007) analyzes the effects of the real value of the U.S. dollar on aggregate 
investment in the U.S. domestic manufacturing sector, using annual time-series data for 1973-2004. The 
main result of the econometric estimation is a negative effect that is much larger than those found in 
previous studies. Moreover, the exchange rate is found to affect investment mainly, although not 
exclusively, through the channel of financial or liquidity constraints, rather than by affecting the desired 
stock of capital. Interestingly, counterfactual simulations show that U.S. manufacturing investment would 
have been 61% higher in 2004 if the dollar had not appreciated after 1995. In a different approach, 
Landon and Smith (2006) estimate the impact of exchange rate movements on the industry-level price of 
investment goods using a panel of OECD countries. They find that an exchange rate depreciation 
(appreciation) causes a significant rise (fall) in the prices of the investment goods used by most 
industries. However, the magnitude of this effect differs greatly across sectors, with a currency 
depreciation causing a stronger increase in the price of investment goods used by industries that produce 
high-technology products and employ a larger proportion of imported capital. As a result, changes in the 
exchange rate may affect both the level and distribution of investment across sectors. 
 Meanwhile, Razmi, Rapetti and Skott (2009) use panel data for 184 countries with 5-year time 
periods spanning 1960-2004 and find that real exchange rate undervaluations are (statistically) significant 
drivers of investment growth, but only in developing countries, this result being robust to different 
specifications, controls, and econometric methods. Meanwhile, Bahmani-Oskooee and Hajilee (2010) 
investigate the effect of currency depreciation on domestic investment using a time-series model of 50 
countries for the 1975–2006 period. Though they find significant positive short-run effects of currency 
depreciation on domestic investment in 43 out of the 50 countries, it is only in 21 countries that there are 
also long-run effects. This latter evidence is inconclusive, though, as a depreciation results in an increase 
in domestic investment in 10 countries, and results in a decrease in the remaining 11 countries. 
 All in all, the empirical evidence seems therefore to be more favorable to the assumption that 
investment varies positively with the real exchange rate, which implies assuming 0iqg   in (11). Note, 
however, that the determinants of investment which are taken as given in the short run (namely,   and 
q ) depend on the state variables z  and e , with   varying positively with z  and q  varying positively 
with e  and negatively with z . Therefore, while ig  varies unambiguously positively with e , it varies 
either positively or negatively with z . Let‘s then conveniently re-write (11) as: 
    ( , , , )i ig g z e u       (12) 
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with 0ieg  . As for the sign of 
i
zg , it will be positive (negative) if an increase in z , by raising  , makes 
for a rise in investment which more (less) than offsets the concomitant fall in investment generated by the 
accompanying fall in q . We will refer to 0izg   ( 0
i
zg  ) as a case of  –effect ( q –effect) dominance in 
investment behavior. 
 Finally, we specify net exports (in real terms) as a proportion of the capital stock, fg , using the 
following implicit function: 
    *( , , )f fg g q u u      (13) 
where *u  is foreign capacity utilization, which is exogenously given. In a standard way, we assume that 
net exports vary positively (negatively) with the real exchange rate and foreign (domestic) capacity 
utilization, so that 0fqg   (the Marshall-Lerner condition holds), * 0
f
u
g   and 0fug  . Now, the domestic 
determinant of net exports which is taken as given in the short run (namely, q ) depends on the state 
variables z  and e , varying negatively with former and positively with the latter. Let‘s then conveniently 
re-write (13) as: 
    *( , , , )f fg g z e u u      (14) 
It then follows that 0feg   and 0
f
zg  . 
 
3. The behavior of the model in the short run 
 For the domestic economy, which is the focus of this paper, the short run is defined as a time 
frame in which the following variables can be taken as given: the stock of capital, K , the supply of labor, 
N , the markup, z , the labor-output ratio, a , the money wage rate, W , the imported (composite) 
intermediate input coefficient, b , the nominal exchange rate, e  (and therefore the price level, P , the real 
exchange rate, q , and the distributive shares,   and  ) and the relevant foreign variables, *u , mP  and 
*P . 
 Since domestic firms hold excess capacity and produce according to aggregate effective demand, 
the macroeconomic equality between leakages and injections (or, the goods market equilibrium) is 
reached through changes in capacity utilization. Hence the existence of excess capacity allows capacity 
utilization to adjust to remove any excess demand or supply in the domestic economy. The goods market 
equilibrium condition can therefore be expressed as: 
    d c i fu g g g g         (15) 
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where dg  is aggregate effective demand as a proportion of the capital stock. As the government sector is 
omitted for simplicity (except for the existence of a monetary authority that manages the nominal 
exchange rate), the domestic economy‘s savings ( s cg u g  ) are spent on financing investment ( ig ) 
and the trade surplus ( fg ). As a result, if net exports are negative ( 0fg  ) and there is therefore a trade 
deficit, it then follows that the excess of domestic investment over national saving is financed by a 
corresponding inflow of foreign saving.
7
 Meanwhile, when there is trade surplus or deficit ( 0fg  ) and 
capital is assumed not to depreciate, the growth rate of the capital stock (which is actually the growth rate 
of this one-good economy) is given by i s fg g g g   . 
 Substituting (10), (12) and (14) into (15) yields the following implicit solution for the short-run 
equilibrium value of domestic capacity utilization: 
  *( , , ) ( , , , ) ( , , , )d c i fu g g z e u g z e u g z e u u       (16) 
Given the demand-driven nature of the equilibrium value of capacity utilization, the corresponding 
equilibrium condition is that u  varies positively (negatively) when there is positive (negative) excess 
aggregate effective demand (which is given by dEDG g u  ). Therefore, the short-run equilibrium 
condition is given by: 
   1 0c i fu u u
EDG
g g g
u

    

     (17) 
which can be re-expressed alternatively as 1c i fu u ug g g    or 
i f c
u u ug g g  . Intuitively, using the latter 
inequality, in the neighborhood of the equilibrium value of capacity utilization, effective demand 
injections (investment and exports) should respond less than effective demand leakages (national savings 
plus imports) to a change in capacity utilization. In other words, any deviation of the excess aggregate 
effective demand from its zero value is self-correcting. 
 Even though we cannot obtain an explicit solution for capacity utilization (denoted by 'u ), we can 
nonetheless perform useful comparative statics exercises with respect to distribution and the real 
exchange rate. Note, however, that we cannot hold the shares of wages and profits constant when the real 
exchange rate changes and vice versa. The reason is that a change in the real exchange rate (wage share) 
brought about by a change in either the nominal exchange rate or the markup will not leave the wage 
                                                 
7
 Note that ( ( ) ( , ))
s c
g u g z q z e    , so that national saving per unit of capital, 
s
g , is also comprised by saving 
supplemented by imports. Indeed, recall that [ / (1 )]q e z e  , so that the share of imported inputs in income (which is equal 
to the real exchange rate) is increasing in the share of imports in variable cost (given by / ( ) / (1 )be aW be e e   ). As a 
higher import cost acts a vehicle for foreign saving, national saving per unit of capital therefore rises with the share of imports 
in variable cost. 
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share (real exchange rate) unchanged, as shown by (4) and (8). Meanwhile, a change in the profit share 
(real exchange rate) brought about by a change in the markup will not leave the real exchange rate (profit 
share) unchanged, as shown by (6) and (8). Indeed, a major motivation underlying our model 
specification in terms of the markup and the nominal exchange rate (and not the distributive shares and 
the real exchange rate) is precisely the need to take into explicit consideration such a joint dynamic 
endogeneity of distribution and the real exchange rate. 
 Let‘s then firstly totally differentiate (16) with respect to capacity utilization and the nominal 
exchange rate (and hence hold the markup constant) to obtain: 
    
'
c i f
e e eg g gu
e
 

 
     (18) 
where 1 0c i fu u ug g g       is the short-run equilibrium condition given by (17). Therefore, for a 
nominal exchange devaluation (and, given its incomplete pass-through into the price level, a real 
exchange devaluation) to raise equilibrium capacity utilization the numerator of the above expression has 
to be positive. Now, while a nominal devaluation leading to a real devaluation makes for a rise in both 
investment and net exports, it also makes, by reducing the wage share, for a fall in consumption (recall 
that a nominal devaluation, despite leaving the profit share unchanged, makes for a rise in the share of 
intermediate imports in income, which is equal to the real exchange rate, at the expense of the wage 
share). As it turns out, nominal exchange devaluations raise (lower) equilibrium capacity utilization if 
what we term its price competitiveness effect (raising of the real exchange rate) is stronger than what we 
term its distributive effect (lowering of the wage share). 
 Let‘s now totally differentiate (16) with respect to capacity utilization and the markup (and hence 
hold the nominal exchange rate constant) to obtain: 
    
' c i fz z zg g gu
z
 

 
     (19) 
where 1 0c i fu u ug g g       is again the short-run equilibrium condition given by (17). Therefore, for a 
rise in the markup, which lowers both the real exchange rate (and hence the share of imported 
intermediates in income) and the wage share (and hence raises the profit share by more than it lowers the 
wage share) to raise equilibrium capacity utilization the numerator of the above expression has to be 
positive. Now, a rise in the markup, by leading to a real exchange appreciation, makes for a fall in both 
investment and net exports. Meanwhile, though a rise in the markup, by lowering both the wage share 
and the share of imported intermediates in income, makes for a fall in consumption, it also makes, by 
increasing the profit share, for a rise in investment. As inferred above in the discussion following (12), 
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the sign of izg  is positive (negative) if an increase in the markup, by raising the profit share, makes for a 
rise in investment which more (less) than offsets the concomitant fall in investment generated by the 
accompanying fall in the real exchange rate. Therefore, if there is q –effect dominance in investment 
( 0izg  ), as we termed it in the discussion following (12), a rise in the markup unambiguously makes for 
a fall in equilibrium capacity utilization. Meanwhile, a  –effect dominance in investment ( 0izg  ) which 
is strong enough to more than offset the accompanying fall in consumption and net exports following a 
rise in the markup makes for a resulting rise in equilibrium capacity utilization. We will refer to ' 0zu   
( ' 0zu  ) as a case of  –effect ( q –effect) dominance in capacity utilization. Therefore, while a 
necessary condition for a  –effect dominance in capacity utilization ( ' 0zu  ) is a  –effect dominance 
in investment ( 0izg  ), a q –effect dominance in investment ( 0
i
zg  ) makes for an unambiguously q –
effect dominance in capacity utilization ( ' 0zu  ). 
 Interestingly, our model shows that what is usually dubbed ‗wage-led capacity utilization‘ 
( ' 0u   ) in the post-Keynesian literature more broadly can be brought about, in an open economy, by a 
fall in either the markup or the nominal exchange rate. As seen above, however, while a nominal 
exchange appreciation leading to a real appreciation makes for a fall in both investment and net exports, 
it also makes, by raising the wage share, for a rise in consumption (recall that a nominal appreciation, 
despite leaving the profit share unchanged, makes for a fall in the share of intermediate imports in income 
which translates into a rise in the wage share). Therefore, wage-led capacity utilization through a nominal 
appreciation obtains when what we termed as its distributive effect (raising of the wage share) is stronger 
than what we termed as its price competitiveness effect (real appreciation); in this case, a nominal 
appreciation makes for a rise in consumption that more than compensates the accompanying fall in 
investment and net exports. Meanwhile, as also seen above, a fall in the markup, by leading to a real 
exchange depreciation, makes for a rise in both investment and net exports. However, though a fall in the 
markup, by raising the wage share, makes for a rise in consumption, it also makes, by reducing the profit 
share, for a fall in investment. Therefore, wage-led capacity utilization through a fall in the markup 
obtains when there is what we termed above as q –effect dominance in capacity utilization; in this case, 
a fall in the markup makes for a rise in consumption and net exports that more than compensates any 
eventual accompanying fall in investment. 
 Meanwhile, our model shows that what is usually dubbed ‗profit-led capacity utilization‘ 
( ' 0u   ) in the post-Keynesian literature can be brought about, even in an open economy, solely by a 
rise in the markup, as the profit share does not depend on the nominal exchange rate. Indeed, it is only the 
distribution between workers and an external claimant represented by the share of imported intermediates 
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in income which is affected by changes in the nominal exchange rate. Now, as seen above, a rise in the 
markup, by leading to a real exchange appreciation, makes for a fall in both investment and net exports. 
Meanwhile, though a rise in the markup, by lowering both the wage share and the share of imported 
intermediates in income, makes for a fall in consumption, it also makes, by increasing the profit share, for 
a rise in investment. As inferred in the discussion following (12), the sign of izg  is positive (negative) if 
an increase in the markup, by raising the profit share, makes for a rise in investment which more (less) 
than offsets the concomitant fall in investment generated by the accompanying fall in the real exchange 
rate. Therefore, profit-led capacity utilization through a rise in the markup obtains when there is what we 
termed above as  –effect dominance in capacity utilization; in this case, a rise in the markup makes for a 
rise in investment that more than compensates the accompanying fall in consumption and net exports. 
 We cannot obtain an explicit solution for the growth rate either, but can likewise perform useful 
comparative statics exercises with respect to distribution and the (nominal and real) exchange rate. As 
noted above, when there is trade surplus or deficit ( 0fg  ) and capital is assumed not to depreciate, the 
growth rate of the capital stock (which is actually the growth rate of this one-good economy, denoted by 
'g ) is given by ' i s fg g g g   . 
 Therefore, let‘s firstly differentiate (12) with respect to the nominal exchange rate (and hence hold 
the markup constant) and use (18) to obtain: 
   
(1 ) ( )'
i c f i c f
e u u u e eg g g g g gg
e
   

 
    (20) 
where 1 0c i fu u ug g g       is again the short-run equilibrium condition given by (17), so that the first 
term in parentheses in the numerator is positive. Meanwhile, iug , which measures the accelerator effect in 
the investment function, ieg , which measures the impact of a nominal devaluation (which leads to a real 
devaluation) on investment, and feg , which measures the impact of a nominal devaluation (which leads 
to a real devaluation) on net exports, are all positive. It is intuitive, therefore, that it takes a very strong 
(negative) impact of a nominal devaluation on consumption, given by ceg , to avoid that such devaluation 
results in a higher equilibrium growth rate. 
 Interestingly, our model shows that what is usually dubbed ‗wage-led growth‘ ( ' 0g   ) in the 
post-Keynesian literature more broadly can be brought about, in an open economy, by a nominal 
exchange appreciation. However, it requires that the positive impact of a nominal appreciation (which 
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leads to a real appreciation) on consumption is strong enough to more than compensate the accompanying 
fall in investment and net exports
8
. 
 Let‘s now differentiate eq. (12) with respect to the markup (and hence hold the nominal exchange 
rate constant) and use eq. (19) to obtain: 
   
(1 ) ( )'
i c f i c f
z u u u z zg g g g g gg
z
   

 
    (21) 
where 1 0c i fu u ug g g       is again the short-run equilibrium condition given by (17), so that the first 
term in parentheses in the numerator is positive. As seen above, the sign of izg  is ambiguous, it being 
positive (negative) if an increase in z , by raising  , makes for a rise in investment which more (less) 
than offsets the concomitant fall in investment generated by the accompanying fall in q . We referred to 
0izg   ( 0
i
zg  ) above as a case of  –effect ( q –effect) dominance in investment behavior. Meanwhile, 
c
zg , which measures the impact of a change in the markup on consumption, and 
f
zg , which measures the 
impact of a change in the markup on net exports, are both negative. Therefore, given that iug , which 
measures the accelerator effect in the investment function, is positive, it follows that a situation of q –
effect dominance in investment behavior ( 0izg  ) ensures that the equilibrium growth rate 
unambiguously varies negatively with the markup; in this case, after all, a rise in the markup makes for a 
fall in all components of aggregate effective demand. It is then the case that a necessary condition for the 
growth rate to vary positively with the markup is that there is  –effect dominance ( 0izg  ) in investment 
behavior. However, (21) shows that it may take a strong positive impact of a rise in the markup on 
investment for the corresponding rise the profit share to reduce in a higher growth rate. Hence our model 
shows that what is usually dubbed ‗profit-led growth‘ ( ' 0g   ) in the post-Keynesian literature can be 
brought about, even in an open economy, solely by a rise in the markup; however, profit-led growth may 
require quite a strong positive response of investment to a rise in the markup. 
 Finally, (21) also reveals under what conditions what is usually dubbed ‗wage-led growth‘ 
( 0g  ) is generated by a fall in the markup. Indeed, a fall in the markup, by leading to a real exchange 
depreciation, makes for a rise in both investment and net exports. However, though a fall in the markup, 
by raising the wage share, makes for a rise in consumption, it also makes, by reducing the profit share, for 
a fall in investment. Therefore, wage-led growth through a fall in the markup unambiguously obtains 
when there is what we termed above as q –effect dominance in investment behavior ( 0izg  ); in this 
                                                 
8
 Clearly, wage-led growth driven by the appreciation of the domestic currency may give rise to mounting problems in the 
external front over the longer run. Though we confine attention to the medium run in the dynamic analysis carried out in the 
next section, such a strategy would be unsustainable in the long run. 
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case, a fall in the markup makes for a rise in all components of aggregate effective demand. Yet wage-led 
growth ( 0g  ) through a fall in the markup may still obtain even if there is what we termed above as 
 –effect dominance in investment behavior ( 0izg  ); what is necessary, in this case, is that the 
corresponding fall in investment is not strong enough to more than compensate the accompanying rise in 
consumption and net exports. 
 
4. The behavior of the model in the medium run 
 In the medium run we assume that the short-run equilibrium values of the variables are always 
attained, with the economy moving over time with changes in the following variables: K , whose 
dynamics is given by g  above; z ; e ; N , whose growth rate is equal to n ; a , which falls at an 
exogenous rate h ; and W , whose growth rate is equal to h . Given the focus of this paper, the labor 
market (but not the labor supply) is assumed to play a passive role, which justifies the assumption that the 
nominal wage is contractually defined to grow at the same rate as labor productivity. In this spirit, we 
assume that the natural growth rate (given by ng n h  ) adjusts to g  through changes in n , which 
implies (further assuming that such an adjustment is fast enough) a constant employment rate over the 
medium run. Therefore, we will follow the behavior of the system over the medium run by formally 
examining the joint dynamic behavior of the markup and the nominal exchange rate. As shown by (3)-(4) 
and (6)-(8), steady-state values for z and e  imply steady-state values for the price level, the distributive 
shares (including the share of intermediate imports, which is equal to the real exchange rate) and the 
profit rate, and hence for the rates of capacity utilization and growth. 
 The nominal exchange rate is managed by the monetary authority in the following ‗crawling peg‘ 
way: 
    ˆ ( )ge q q        (22) 
where ˆ ( / )(1/ )e de dt e  denotes the proportionate rate of change of the nominal exchange rate, gq  is the 
preferred real exchange rate by the government and 0   is the corresponding speed of adjustment. The 
reaction function above is intended to convey the idea that the monetary authority, taking the markup as 
given (as it is not under its direct control), manages the nominal exchange rate so as to achieve its 
preferred real exchange rate. Given the markup, therefore, corresponding to a given preferred real 
exchange rate by the government there is an exogenous preferred nominal exchange rate, ge . To make 
this intuition explicit, we use (8) to re-write the above reaction function as: 
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   ˆ
(1 ) (1 )
g
g
e e
e
z e z e

 
  
   
     (23) 
 Meanwhile, capitalists manage the markup so as to achieve a preferred level of international 
competitiveness as measured by the real exchange rate: 
    ˆ ( )cz q q        (24) 
where ˆ ( / )(1/ )z dz dt z  denotes the proportionate rate of change of the markup, cq  is the preferred real 
exchange rate by capitalists and 0   is the corresponding speed of adjustment. Analogously to the 
reaction function governing the dynamics of the nominal exchange rate, the reaction function above is 
intended to convey the idea that capitalists, taking the nominal exchange rate as given (as it is not under 
their direct control), manage the markup so as to achieve their preferred international competitiveness as 
measured by the real exchange rate. Given the nominal exchange rate, therefore, corresponding to a given 
preferred real exchange rate by capitalists there is an exogenous preferred markup, cz . To make this 
intuition explicit, we use (8) to re-write the above reaction function as: 
   ˆ
(1 ) (1 )c
e e
z
z e z e

 
  
  
     (25) 
We can now solve for the medium-run equilibrium by imposing the equilibrium conditions ˆˆ 0z e   on 
(25) and (23). As z  and e  are both strictly positive, this yields the isoclines: 
    cz z        (26) 
and: 
    ge e        (27) 
It follows directly from (26) and (27) that ' cz z  and ' ge e , respectively (where an apostrophe again 
denotes the equilibrium value of a variable), so that there is a unique (non-trivial) medium-run 
equilibrium solution.
9
 Moreover, the corresponding equilibrium solution for the real exchange rate is 
given by ' c gq q q  . Note that the equilibrium configuration so identified is stable, as the determinant 
and the trace of the Jacobian matrix corresponding to the system given by (23) and (25) (both evaluated 
at the non-trivial solution) are positive and negative, respectively. Graphically, the ˆ 0z   isocline is 
parallel to the e  axis, while the ˆ 0e   isocline is parallel to the z  axis, with the equilibrium configuration 
                                                 
9
 In game-theoretic parlance, the reaction functions given by (23) and (25) can be interpreted as best reply functions and the 
resulting medium-run equilibrium solution can therefore be defined as a Nash equilibrium. 
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given by 1 ( ', ') ( , )c gE z e z e   being a stable node (which implies that any convergence of the nominal 
exchange rate to its medium-run equilibrium value does not involve either over- or undershooting). 
 Note that our specification of the preferred real exchange rates gq  and cq  (which makes explicit 
the distinction between controllable and non-controllable variables by those who hold them) makes them 
endogenous variables. Indeed, it is only in the medium-run equilibrium that the monetary authority and 
capitalists come to share a common preference with respect the level of the real exchange rate. 
 As a result, not only is the monetary authority able to both set and achieve a desired nominal 
exchange rate, it is able to do so without thwarting the achievement of any desired markup by capitalists 
set independently of ge . Note that, by the same token, it is also possible in the model above for capitalists 
to set and pursue a desired markup without thwarting the achievement of any desired nominal exchange 
by the monetary authority set independently of cz . To see these results, consider again a figure plotting 
the isoclines in (26) and (27) assuming two different desired nominal exchange rates and two different 
desired markups. Suppose firstly that the monetary authority, willing to improve external competitiveness 
from its medium-run equilibrium, raises gq  to 
"
gq  by raising ge  to 
"
ge . As a result, the ˆ 0e   isocline 
moves upward (assuming that e  is in the vertical axis) and the new medium-run equilibrium, 2E , is 
characterized by higher levels of nominal and real exchange rate. In fact, the economy converges to its 
new medium-run equilibrium along the original ˆ 0z   isocline, with the gap between the higher gq  and 
the current q  being closed over time as e  rises. And as e  and q  rises, so does cq , given that cz z  
along the convergence path. 
 Indeed, this same rise (depreciation) in the medium-run equilibrium real exchange rate could be 
obtained through a rise in the same amount in the preferred real exchange rate by capitalists. Indeed, a 
rise in cq  (to which, given the nominal exchange rate, a fall in cz  to 
"
cz  corresponds) moves the ˆ 0z   
isocline leftward (assuming that z  is in the horizontal axis), with the new medium-run equilibrium 
configuration, 3E , being characterized by a lower markup and a higher real exchange rate. In this case, 
the economy converges to its new medium-run equilibrium along the original ˆ 0e   isocline, with the gap 
between the higher cq  and the current q  being closed over time as z  rises. And as z  falls and q  rises, 
gq  likewise rises, given that ge e  along the convergence path. 
 However, note that these two ways of increasing the medium-run equilibrium level of 
international competitiveness have quite different distributive (and hence capacity utilization and growth) 
implications. In fact, nominal exchange devaluations, by translating into real depreciations, reduce the 
wage share despite keeping the profit share unchanged. As seen in the previous section, while a real 
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exchange devaluation makes for a rise in both investment and net exports, it also makes, by reducing the 
wage share, for a fall in consumption which may be strong enough to result in a fall in capacity utilization 
and (eventually) growth in the new medium-run equilibrium (per (18) and (20)). Meanwhile, a fall in the 
markup, by leading to real exchange depreciation, also makes for a rise in both investment and net 
exports. Now, though a fall in the markup, by raising both the wage share and the share of imported 
intermediates in income, makes for a rise in consumption, it also makes, by reducing the profit share, for 
a fall in investment. As inferred above in the discussion following (12), the sign of izg  is negative 
(positive) if a fall in the markup, by lowering the profit share, makes for a fall in investment which less 
(more) than offsets the concomitant rise in investment generated by the accompanying rise in the real 
exchange rate. Therefore, if there is q –effect dominance in investment ( 0izg  ), as we termed it in the 
discussion following (12), a fall in the markup unambiguously makes for a rise in equilibrium capacity 
utilization. Meanwhile, a  –effect dominance in investment ( 0izg  ) which is strong enough to more 
than offset the accompanying rise in consumption and net exports following a fall in the markup makes 
for a resulting fall in equilibrium capacity utilization and (eventually) growth (per (19) and (21)). 
 Therefore, an interesting feature of the model is that it provides an explanation for a stable 
medium-run real exchange rate based on the tradition of analyzing the evolution of prices (among which 
the nominal exchange rate) from the standpoint of the distributive conflict. While macrodynamic models 
generally assume that there is an exogenous level of the real exchange rate acting as a medium (or long) 
run attractor, our model endogenously produces an equilibrium real exchange rate stemming from 
evolving heterogeneous preferences over the exchange rate by the government and capitalists. In fact, the 
level at which the real exchange rate will become stable in the medium run can be traced back to 
reasonable assumptions about the preferred levels by capitalists and the monetary authority and their 
corresponding reaction functions.. Moreover, the dynamic framework set forth above is flexible enough 
to allow for changes in behavioral assumptions related to domestic and external conditions (more or less 
intense foreign competition) and evolving objectives by the government (giving more weight either to 
income distribution, stabilization or international competitiveness and growth). 
 Indeed, the dynamic analysis conducted so far assumes that the monetary authority has a preferred 
real exchange rate, gq  (to which, given the markup, a desired nominal exchange rate, ge , corresponds) 
and manages the actual nominal exchange rate as described by (22). Analogously, capitalists are assumed 
to have a preferred real exchange rate, cq  (to which, given the nominal exchange rate, a desired markup, 
cz , corresponds) and to manage the actual markup according to (24). Meanwhile, (23) conveys the idea 
that the monetary authority, by taking its non-controllable variable ( z ) as given, manages its controllable 
variable ( e ) over time so as to achieve its preferred real exchange rate. Analogously again, (25) conveys 
   
21 
the idea that capitalists, by taking their non-controllable variable ( e ) as given, manage their controllable 
variable ( z ) over time so as to achieve their preferred real exchange rate. 
 Let‘s now specify the dynamic adjustment of the nominal exchange rate and the markup in the 
following alternative way (allowed by our decomposition of the real exchange rate into its ultimate 
determinants, the nominal exchange rate and the markup). Instead of (23) and (25) we now have: 
   ˆ
(1 ) (1 )g
e e
e
z e z e

 
  
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     (28) 
and 
   ˆ
(1 ) (1 )
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z e z e
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     (29) 
We are therefore assuming, let‘s say, interactive reaction functions. We are basically assuming that ge e  
and cz z  continuously, as if resulting from an instantaneous adjustment. Meanwhile, gz  denotes the 
desired markup by the monetary authority (that is, given e , the markup implied by its preferred real 
exchange rate) and ce  denotes the desired nominal exchange rate by capitalists (that is, given z , the 
nominal exchange rate implied by their preferred real exchange rate). Basically, we are again using the 
fact that there are at least two reasons for why, for instance, q  is lower than gq : first, given z , we have 
ge e ; and second, given e , we have gz z . Recall, however, that the monetary authority controls e  
rather than z . In the previous specification, we assumed that the monetary authority, taking z  as given, 
measures any discrepancy between q  and gq , and changes e  accordingly, by the corresponding 
discrepancy between e  and ge . In this alternative specification, meanwhile, we assume that the monetary 
authority, taking e  as given (as ge e  instantaneously), measures any discrepancy between q  and gq , 
and changes e  accordingly, by the corresponding discrepancy between z  and gz . And we are applying 
the same intuition to capitalists‘ preferred real exchange rate. In fact, there are at least two reasons for 
why, for instance, q  is lower than cq : first, given e , we have cz z ; and second, given z , we have 
ge e . Recall, however, that capitalists control z  rather than e . In the previous specification, we 
assumed that capitalists, taking e  as given, measure any discrepancy between q  and cq , and changes z  
accordingly, by the corresponding discrepancy between z  and cz . In this alternative specification, 
meanwhile, we assume that capitalists, taking z  as given (as cz z  instantaneously), measure any 
discrepancy between q  and cq , and change z  accordingly, by the corresponding discrepancy between e  
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and ce . In the first specification, therefore, the lag is in the adjustment of e  to ge , and of z  to cz ; in this 
second specification, the lag is in the adjustment of e  to ce , and of z  to gz . 
A possible substantive rationale for the reaction function given by (28) is to assume that the 
government aims to curb firms‘ market power. Whenever the markup is considered by policy-makers as 
too high, the government reduces e  and puts more competitive pressure on domestic firms. In fact, such a 
policy may be part of an effort to reduce the price level of the economy. Conversely, if z  is already low 
and the government considers that this may compromise, for instance, internal funds for investment, then 
the government raises e  (which amounts to increase the ―protection‖ of domestic firms from foreign 
competition). Firms then react by reasserting their own perception of the market power they actually 
have. They will be less concerned with income distribution and more concerned with not moving too far 
apart of what they see as a sustainable level of international competitiveness. 
 We can solve for the medium-run equilibrium corresponding to this alternative specification by 
imposing the equilibrium conditions ˆˆ 0z e   on (28) and (29). As z  and e  are both strictly positive, 
this yields the isoclines: 
    ce e        (30) 
and: 
    gz z        (31) 
It follows directly from (30) and (31) that ' ce e  and ' gz z , respectively (where an apostrophe again 
denotes the equilibrium value of a variable), so that there is a unique (non-trivial) medium-run 
equilibrium solution. Moreover, the corresponding equilibrium solution for the real exchange rate is 
given by ' c gq q q  . Note that the equilibrium configuration so identified is saddle-point unstable, 
though, as the determinant of the Jacobian matrix corresponding to the system given by (28) and (29) 
(evaluated at the non-trivial solution) is negative, which is a necessary and sufficient condition for 
saddle-point instability to obtain. Graphically, the ˆ 0z   isocline is parallel to the z  axis, while the ˆ 0e   
isocline is parallel to the e  axis, with the equilibrium configuration given by 1 ( ', ') ( , )g cE z e z e   being 
saddle-point unstable. As a result, any convergence of the nominal exchange rate to its medium-run 
equilibrium value (which nonetheless takes place solely along the negatively sloped stable arm of the 
saddle path, assuming that e  is in the vertical axis) does not involve either over- or undershooting. 
 Now, what if the monetary authority cares more about distribution (to wit, share of workers in 
income) than international competitiveness? Recall that the real exchange rate and the share of workers in 
income are inversely related. In the previous specification, (28) shows that when z  rises, the monetary 
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authority reacts by raising e . However, both changes affect the wage share negatively, so that workers 
my have enough influence over the monetary authority to persuade it to compensate for a rise in z  with a 
reduction in e . Note that now it is the real exchange rate that is affected negatively by both changes, 
though the workers‘ share may end up rising. Formally, this pro-labor crawling peg, let‘s say, means that 
the parameter   in (28) becomes negative. As with previous specification, it follows directly from (30) 
and (31) that ' ce e  and ' gz z , respectively, so that there is a unique (non-trivial) medium-run 
equilibrium solution. Moreover, the corresponding equilibrium solution for the real exchange rate is 
given by ' c gq q q  . Note that a limit cycle obtains, though, as the determinant and the trace of the 
Jacobian matrix corresponding to the system given by (28) and (29) (evaluated at the non-trivial solution) 
are now positive and zero, respectively. Graphically, the ˆ 0z   isocline is parallel to the z  axis, while the 
ˆ 0e   isocline is parallel to the e  axis, yielding the equilibrium configuration represented by 
1 ( ', ') ( , )g cE z e z e  . As a result, the nominal exchange rate oscillates over time, alternating between 
over- or undershooting along the way. 
In this third specification, therefore, we suppose that the monetary authority (possibly under the 
pressure of workers) actually manages the nominal exchange rate to ensure that workers‘ share in income 
(and the implied real exchange rate) is realized: g w g wq q    . As a result, there is a (unique) 
stationary point again, but a limit cycle obtains. For any initial values of the nominal exchange rate and 
the markup, the solution of the system yields a closed trajectory: if left undisturbed, the model will 
produce conservative cyclical fluctuations in the nominal exchange rate and the markup (and hence in the 
real exchange rate, income distribution, capacity utilization and growth). In fact, there is now a dynamic 
conflict between distribution (with the monetary authority managing the nominal exchange rate so as to 
ensure that workers‘ desired wage share, and the implied workers‘ preferred real exchange rate, is 
reached) and external competitiveness. 
Consider point A in Figure 1. As gz z  but ce e , it follows that 'q q , so that the reaction 
functions make the economy move over time with rising markup and falling nominal exchange rate. In B, 
ce e  but gz z , so that 'q q . In fact, in its way from A to B the economy crosses point A‘, in which 
'q q . Now, what happens to distribution (measured by the wage share), capacity utilization and growth 
as the economy travels from A to B depends on the signs of the corresponding comparative statics, as 
discussed in the previous section. Consider point C now. As gz z  but ce e , it follows that 'q q , so 
that the reaction function make the economy moves over time with rising nominal exchange rate and 
falling markup. In D, ce e  but gz z , so that 'q q . Indeed, in its way from C to D the economy 
crosses again the isocline through the origin (point C‘) in which 'q q . As 'q q  in D, the reaction 
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functions make the economy move over time with rising markup and nominal exchange rate, which keeps 
'q q  up to point A‘. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1:  Limit cycle and endogenous cyclical fluctuations 
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Therefore, one way of comparing the results derived in this section is the following. Suppose the 
economy is in a short run in which the monetary authority and capitalists have different preferences with 
respect to the real exchange. The question is: will these differences vanish over time? If so, how, with 
kind of adjustment dynamics? Or, more formally, is there a medium-run equilibrium in which they come 
to have a common preferred real exchange rate? Will the economy converge to that situation? That is, 
does an equilibrium with c gq q  exist? If so, is it stable? The answer to all these questions is that it 
depends on the adjustment dynamics. In the first case, in which a stable node obtains, the answer is a 
double yes: there is an equilibrium with c gq q  and it is stable, so that the economy will converge 
monotonically to it from any initial point which is not the equilibrium itself. In the second specification, 
in which saddle-point instability obtains, the answer is that there is an equilibrium with c gq q , but the 
economy will converge to it only by a fluke (that is, only if it happens to be in the stable arm of the 
saddle path). In the limit cycle case, the answer is that there is an equilibrium with c gq q , but the 
economy will never converge to it from any initial point which is not the equilibrium itself. 
As a result, interesting policy implications can be drawn from the dynamic analysis conducted 
above. As regards stability, the first specification is clearly the more benign for the economy: if the 
government cares about e  while firms care about z , both reach their targets. The only problem is that 
this may not be viable in the longer run, depending on the equilibrium real exchange rate and ensuing 
effects on current account. In the second specification the government ―monitors‖ the markup, which 
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makes sense if the government aims at reducing inflation, or as part of a policy in which the government 
wants to encourage competition in the industry by reducing the price of imports. The last specification, in 
which the government is mainly concerned with distribution in favor of workers, is interesting because it 
makes sense form a political point of view (in many countries unions have significant influence on 
government) and at the same time produces a cyclical movement of the exchange rate (and other macro 
variables) that resembles the experience of several developing countries. 
 
5. Summary 
Although a burgeoning theoretical and empirical literature has been emphasizing the growth-
enhancing properties of an undervalued real exchange rate, interclass and intraclass conflicts over the 
preferred real exchange rate, which are actually very common, have been ignored. In fact, the literature 
has been ignoring not only that capitalists, workers and the government (usually reacting to pressures 
from those classes) have different preferences with respect to the desired real exchange rate, but also that 
those players have quite different instruments to influence the course of the actual real exchange rate, 
with none of them having direct control over all the variables on which the real exchange rate ultimately 
depends. Meanwhile, the real exchange rate and functional income distribution are functionally related: 
whether the real exchange rate and the wage share, for instance, move in the same or opposite direction 
depends on the ultimate source of the change in any of them. 
This paper contributes to this literature by developing a dynamic model of capacity utilization and 
growth in which the joint determination of income distribution and international competitiveness 
(measure by the real exchange rate) is taken into account in the determination of aggregate effective 
demand. In a given short run, how a change in the real exchange rate will affect capacity utilization and 
growth depends on whether it has come about through a change in either the nominal exchange rate or the 
markup (or both). Indeed, a major motivation underlying our formal specification in terms of the markup 
and the nominal exchange rate (and not the distributive shares and the real exchange rate themselves) as 
state variables is precisely the need to take into explicit consideration such a joint determination of 
income distribution and international competitiveness. 
Over the medium run, the nominal exchange rate (markup) will vary in response to discrepancies 
between the actual real exchange rate and the real exchange rate preferred by the government 
(capitalists). However, as a change in the actual exchange rate may come about through a change in either 
the nominal exchange rate or the markup (or both), different specifications of the adjustment dynamics of 
the nominal exchange rate and the markup will have distinct implications in terms of existence and 
stability of a medium-run equilibrium solution for the real exchange rate, and thereby for the dynamics of 
capacity utilization and growth over the medium run. 
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While there is a medium-run (Nash) equilibrium characterized by capitalists and government 
coming to share a preferred real exchange rate, whether and how the economy will converge to it depends 
crucially on the specifics of the adjustment dynamics of the nominal exchange rate and the markup. In 
fact, while in one specification of such adjustment dynamics the economy necessarily converges to the 
medium-run equilibrium characterized by capitalists and the monetary authority sharing a preferred real 
exchange rate, in another specification such a convergence obtains only by a fluke. Meanwhile, when the 
government is primarily concerned with distribution in favor of workers when managing the nominal 
exchange rate, a limit cycle obtains. In this latter specification, the model produces conservative 
fluctuations in the markup and the nominal exchange rate, and hence in distributive shares and the real 
exchange rate; as a result, the economy experiences endogenous cyclical fluctuations of its international 
competitiveness, capacity utilization and economic growth that closely resemble the experience of several 
developing countries. As it turns out, a major empirical implication of the model developed in this paper 
is that growth regressions featuring the real exchange rate (or an index of real exchange undervaluation) 
should include functional distribution (or proxies such as real unit labor costs) in the vector of control 
variables. Or, some procedure should be used to decompose a change in the real exchange rate into 
changes in the major components of the real exchange rate, namely, nominal exchange rate, nominal unit 
labor (and, possibly, intermediate) costs and profit margins. 
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